Combustible dust incidents should work more closely with the fire service By John Astad

Stakeholders seeking control measures to minimize the probability and severity of combustible dust incidents should work more closely with the fire service.
John Astad – Combustible dust-related fires occur with alarming regularity throughout the manufacturing, non-manufacturing, and utility sectors. In 2008 following the tragic Imperial Sugar Refinery dust explosion, the Combustible Dust Policy Institute discovered through researching media accounts that more than 80 percent of combustible dust incidents were fires. The majority of these fire incidents sustained minor property damage with no fatalities and minimal injuries.

Normalization of Deviation
A troubling situation arises when nothing catastrophic follows recurring combustible dust-related fires. Illuminating histories of catastrophic dust explosions investigated by the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) during the past eight years indicated that, prior to deadly dust explosions, facilities experienced numerous non-threatening combustible dust-related fires.

Fire service professionals, facility owners, occupational safety managers, and workers misinterpret that the manufacturing process is safe following a minor combustible dust-related fire, especially when, in most instances, the small fire is suppressed by the workforce with fire extinguishers and a fire department response is not required.

This is a false interpretation that all is okay following these non-consequential fires. The notion that through random luck a catastrophic dust explosion hasn’t happened yet further reinforces this false interpretation. This train of thought is referred to as “normalization of deviation,” such as in the repeatable combustible dust-related fires that seem a normal part of the process.

…While it is good news that the fatality and injury count is minimal following manufacturing fires, it should not deviate from continued proactive fire prevention and control measures so as to prevent future catastrophic events.

Reinforcing the idea that combustible dust-related fires are a subset of all fires and not a separate entity that has entirely different heat sources than the ignition of flammable gases, liquids, and vapors is absolutely essential. Most importantly, the only difference between these flammable products and combustible dust is vast differences in ignition sensitivity, such as minimum ignition energy (MIE) and flashpoint/minimum ignition temperature.

The CSB Dust Hazard Study
In 2006, the CSB released its “Combustible Dust Hazard Study” findings and proposed recommendations to OSHA, manufacturing sector stakeholders, and the public. This report was the direct result of the three catastrophic combustible dust explosions that occurred in 2003 in which CSB was the lead federal investigation team seeking root causes. The board noted in the report:

“… no federal or state agency keeps specific statistics on combustible dust incidents, nor does any single data source provide a comprehensive collection of all these incidents”

Readers of the study might be confused by the above statement, especially because the USFA National Fire Data Center collects specific statistics on all fires through NFIRS 5.0. This reporting system was initiated in 1976 when six states piloted an incident reporting system that is now referred to as NFIRS.

Please read more at:
http://ohsonline.com/articles/2011/01/01/better-identification-of-fire-hazards-needed.aspx?sc_lang=en